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Recent Developments: Louisiana Medical Malpractice
Law
Natalie J. Dekaris*
Michael C. Mims∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice remains one of the most heavily litigated
areas of the law in Louisiana.1 One of the biggest developments seen
in the field over the past few years is the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, reaffirming the
constitutionality of the State’s statutory cap on damages in medical
malpractice cases.2 This Article discusses the holding of Oliver and
also explores recent developments in Louisiana medical malpractice
law related to prescription, expert witnesses and summary judgment,
damages, informed consent, medical review panels, the standard of
care, and the Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF).
II. OLIVER V. MAGNOLIA CLINIC AND THE LOUISIANA SUPREME
COURT’S UPHOLDING OF THE CAP
Louisiana’s cap on damages for medical malpractice actions is
set forth in the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) at Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42.3 Louisiana’s cap was adopted
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Murchison, who provided research assistance for this piece.
1. As of November 9, 2013, a Westlaw search of (MEDICAL HOSPITAL
DOCTOR PHYSICIAN SURGEON NURS! /s MALPRACTICE) in the database
“LA (State & Fed.)” for all dates after January 1, 2011 reveals 595 reported cases.
2. Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39 (La. 2012). See also Arrington v.
ER Physician Grp., Inc., 110 So. 3d 193 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2013), cert. denied, 111
So. 3d 1011 (La. 2013); Taylor v. Clement, 110 So. 3d 199 (La. Ct. App. 3d
2013), cert. denied, 111 So. 3d 1011 (La. 2013).
3. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.42(B) provides, in pertinent
part: “(1) The total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries to or
death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits as provided
in R.S. 40:1299.43, shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars plus interest
and cost.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B).
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in 1975 “and remains relatively unchanged since its inception.”4
Over the years, Louisiana’s cap has faced several constitutional
challenges.5 The Louisiana Supreme Court undertook one such
challenge in the recent case Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic.6
In Oliver, the plaintiffs alleged that a nurse practitioner failed to
correctly and timely diagnose a child’s neuroblastoma, resulting in
serious injuries.7 At trial, a jury found that the defendant was
negligent and awarded damages of approximately $10 million.8 The
plaintiffs requested a declaration that the MMA’s cap on damages
was unconstitutional, which the trial court denied.9 On appeal, the
Oliver plaintiffs argued that the cap: (1) deprived victims of their
right to an adequate remedy at law and (2) violated the Equal
Protection Clause by arbitrarily and capriciously discriminating on
the basis of physical condition.10 On remand from the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal agreed with the
plaintiffs, reversed the trial court, and declared the cap
unconstitutional.11 After granting writs, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed the Third Circuit and reinstated the holding of the
trial court.12
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on its 1992 holding
in Butler v. Flint Goodridge Hospital of Dillard University, when it
last addressed the constitutionality of the cap.13 The Court explained
that the right of malpractice victims to sue for damages was not a
fundamental constitutional right, and therefore the State was
required only to demonstrate a legitimate state objective that would

4. Bradley R. Belsome, Cap Conundrum, PHYSICIAN INSURER, Fourth
Quarter 2012, at 22 n.2, available at http://www.piaa.us/docs/PI/PI_4th_2012.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V8AD-U8TB] (archived Mar. 11, 2014) (“The act was amended
in 1984 to remove future medical care and related benefits from being within its
coverage.” (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.43)).
5. See, e.g., Butler v. Flint Goodridge Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So. 2d 517
(La. 1992).
6. Oliver, 85 So. 3d 39.
7. Id. at 41.
8. Id. (awarding $6 million in general damages, $629,728.24 in past medical
expenses, $3,358,828 in future medical expenses, and $33,000 to the patient’s
father and $200,000 to the patient’s mother for loss of consortium).
9. Id. at 42.
10. Id. at 43.
11. Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 71 So. 3d 1170 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011). Three
judges dissented, opining that the cap was constitutional under the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s holding in Butler v. Flint Goodridge Hospital of Dillard
University, 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992).
12. Oliver, 85 So. 3d at 50.
13. 607 So. 2d 517.
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be furthered by the discrimination.14 The Oliver Court then
explained why the cap furthered a legitimate state objective:
This “quid pro quo” acknowledged in Butler is just as
constitutionally sound today as it was when we addressed it in
1992 insofar as the same objective exists now as at the time of
the legislation’s inception in 1975; i.e., the legislature acted to
combat the rising insurance premiums in an inherently risky
industry in order to avoid a healthcare crisis in this state. Both
now and then, malpractice claims exceeding the cap’s
monetary limit would effectively increase the probability that
health care providers would not have medical malpractice
insurance sufficient to pay for these uncapped damages. The
result would be an underfunded, perhaps insolvent system of
recovery for malpractice victims. Any discrimination resulting
from the cap, while unfortunate, substantially furthers a
legitimate state interest, making the “imperfect balance”
“reasonable.”15
In upholding the cap, the Court emphasized that it only
possessed the authority to review whether the cap violated the
constitution—“any other perceived infirmity,” such as the Oliver
plaintiffs’ argument that the cap prevented injured victims from ever
being made whole, “is to be addressed by the legislature.”16
Soon after handing down its opinion in Oliver, on April 12,
2013, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied all writ applications in
the consolidated cases of Arrington v. Galen-Med and Taylor v.
Clement, two other Third Circuit cases involving the alleged
unconstitutionality of the cap.17 In light of these writ denials, the
Supreme Court will likely not entertain challenges to the
constitutionality of the cap in the near future.
III. PRESCRIPTION
Another heavily litigated area of Louisiana medical malpractice
law is prescription, which presents a unique set of challenges.
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5628 provides the prescriptive
period applicable to medical malpractice actions.18 Under the
14. Oliver, 85 So. 3d at 44–45.
15. Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 46.
17. See Arrington v. ER Physician Grp., Inc., 110 So. 3d 193 (La. Ct. App. 3d
2013); Taylor v. Clement, 110 So. 3d 199 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2013).
18. That statute provides in relevant part:
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician . . .
whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out
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Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 9:5628, medical malpractice actions are subject to
both a traditional one-year prescriptive period and a separate, unique
three-year prescriptive period.19 The three-year prescriptive period is
notable because it is not subject to interruption under contra non
valentem’s discovery rule.20 Also unique to medical malpractice
actions is the fact that only a complaint filed with the PCF will serve
to suspend prescription.21 These distinct rules render issues of
prescription common in medical malpractice cases, including issues
related to the commencement, suspension, and interruption of
prescription.
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of commencement of
prescription in Dingler v. Heart Clinic of Louisiana.22 There, the
Court held that the patient, who suffered a heart attack the same day
that he was sent home from the hospital after stress tests, had
sufficient information to begin the running of prescription on his
claim that the healthcare provider failed to properly diagnose his
condition and admit him to the hospital immediately.23 The court
refused to adopt the plaintiff’s argument that it was not until after he
obtained a second opinion as to the advisability of his returning to
employment, necessitating another stress test and inevitably
highlighting the disparity in the way the stress tests were
administered, that he was alerted to the possibility that the former
test was not properly done.24
Similarly, in Davidson v. Glenwood Resolution Authority, Inc.,25
a plaintiff was deemed to have constructive notice that the metal

of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date
of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date
of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to
claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events
such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from
the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (2008).
19. See, e.g., Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42, 48 (La. 2007).
20. Id. at 69 (“We therefore reaffirm our holding in Hebert that both the oneyear and three-year periods set forth in LSA–R.S. 9:5628 are prescriptive [not
preemptive], with the qualification that the contra non valentem type exception to
prescription embodied in the discovery rule is expressly made inapplicable after
three years from the act, omission, or neglect.”).
21. See Bush v. Nat’l Health Care of Leesville, 939 So. 2d 1216 (La. 2006);
LeBreton v. Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226 (La. 1998).
22. 113 So. 3d 269 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2013).
23. Id. at 270.
24. Id.
25. 108 So. 3d 345 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2013).
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object in his abdominal cavity was likely related to the surgery
performed by the defendant–physician.26 The court dismissed the
patient’s argument that he did not learn that he had a claim against
the doctor until specifically informed that the piece of metal was
from the retractor used during the surgery.27 The surgery occurred
on April 6, 2006, and the evidence established that as early as July
12, 2006, the plaintiff
could feel a ‘square corner’ in his abdomen and knew that
there was something that should not be there. He saw . . . his
primary physician, but the test ordered by [the physician] did
not find anything. On August 15, 2006, a CT scan taken after
an automobile accident revealed the presence of the metal
object.28
The ER physician at that time indicated that he advised the plaintiff
to follow up with his physician about the metal object.29 The
radiologist who first noted the presence of the metal object on the
CT scan also contacted the surgeon, who in turn made several
attempts to contact the plaintiff.30 Then, in September 2006 another
physician noted the presence of the metal object on an x-ray but
informed the plaintiff that he believed that it was probably the
plaintiff’s penile implant.31 However, the Second Circuit noted that,
at that time, the plaintiff knew that his penile implant had been
removed.32
A key holding regarding suspension of prescription in medical
malpractice cases can be found in the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center.33 There, the
Court held that the dismissal, rather than notification of dismissal, of
a proposed complaint of malpractice for failure to appoint an
attorney–chairman begins the running of the 90-day grace period in
which prescription is suspended.34 In Turner, the PCF complaint
was filed August 20, 2009.35 On May 24, 2010, the PCF sent the
claimant a “nine month letter” warning of impending dismissal per
the MMA’s requirement that an attorney–chairperson be appointed

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
108 So. 3d 60 (La. 2012).
Id. at 67.
Id. at 61.
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within one year of filing the complaint.36 The MMA further
provides that this “nine month letter” must be sent to the claimant 90
days in advance of dismissal.37 Then, on August 25, 2010, the PCF
sent the claimant a letter advising that the complaint was
dismissed.38 The claimant thereafter filed suit on November 23,
2010—within 90 days of the PCF’s letter notifying the claimant of
the dismissal but more than 90 days from the one-year anniversary
of the filing of the PCF complaint.39 The trial court sustained the
defendant’s exception of prescription, but the Second Circuit
reversed.40 The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s judgment,
holding that, by operation of law, dismissal occurs one year from the
date that the request for medical review panel is filed.41
However, the Supreme Court in Turner also recognized that
there may be instances where 90 days from the date of the “nine
month letter” is a longer period than one year from the date of the
PCF complaint (i.e., when the PCF does not timely send the “nine
month letter”), and there may be instances where 90 days from the
date of a timely sent “nine month letter” will be shorter than the oneyear period (i.e., where those months include months with 31
days).42 The Court determined that “in the few instances where the
one year period and the [90] days from nine months period are
different and one would maintain the action, that interpretation must
be followed.”43
In the recent case of In re Robinson,44 the Second Circuit also
addressed suspension of prescription by holding that filing a request
for a medical review panel with the PCF will not suspend the
running of prescription.45 Rather, the Division of Administration is
the proper entity with which to file a request for a medical panel
review.46 Filing in any other venue is invalid and without effect.47
In addition, according to the Supreme Court’s recent
pronouncement in Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc.,48 if a nonhealthcare provider is a joint tortfeasor with a healthcare provider,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
2013).
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c) (2008).
§ 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c).
Turner, 108 So. 3d at 64.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 65.
Id.
In re Robinson, No. 47,380, 2013 WL 163735 (La. Ct. App. 2d Jan. 16,
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
120 So. 3d 678 (La. 2013).
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the provision of the MMA that suspends the running of prescription
against a healthcare provider during the pendency of a timely filed
medical review panel complaint will be applied to suspend the
running of prescription on the claim against the non-healthcare
provider.49
Issues related to interruption of prescription have also developed
over the past few years. In Santiago v. Tulane University Hospital &
Clinic, an amended petition and supplemental PCF complaint filed
more than three years after the alleged malpractice were deemed not
to relate back to the time of the filing of the original complaint.50
Also, the catch-all provision of the amended petition, incorporating
by reference all allegations contained in the original petition,
precluded the amended petition from superseding the original
petition; thus, the original petition interrupted prescription despite
the fact that the amended petition withdrew the sole claim of the
original petition.51
In Santiago, the plaintiff timely filed a medical malpractice
complaint against a physician, a hospital, and an unidentified x-ray
technician, alleging that she was dropped or improperly restrained
during postoperative testing while still under general anesthesia.52
The panel found no breach of the standard of care, and the patient
filed a post-panel lawsuit.53 More than three years after the alleged
malpractice, the patient amended her lawsuit to add new physicians,
new radiologist technologists, and nurses.54 Significantly, the
amended petition alleged that the newly added technologists and
nurses were directly responsible for the plaintiff’s fall, rather than
the original defendant–physician.55 The amended pleading also set
forth completely new negligence allegations against the original
defendant–physician, alleging that he was at fault for failing to
diagnose and report her fracture, failing to prevent further harm, and
falsifying operative and x-ray reports.56
All of the named physicians then filed an exception of
peremption,57 arguing that all claims against the original defendant–
physician should be dismissed because the original PCF complaint
and petition against him could not suspend prescription where no
49. Id. at 690. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) (2008).
50. 115 So. 3d 675 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2013).
51. Id. at 686–87.
52. Id. at 678.
53. Id. at 678–79.
54. Id. at 679.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The Court noted that the pleading should have been styled as an exception
of prescription. Id.
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specific allegations were lodged against him (apparently due to the
retroactive superseding effect that the amended petition arguably
had).58 The newly added physicians also sought dismissal because
they were not named as defendants until more than three years after
the alleged malpractice.59 The trial court granted the exception and
dismissed all claims contained in all petitions.60 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit found that all claims filed in the amended and
supplemental petition were prescribed as a matter of law because the
relation-back principles of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1153 do not interrupt prescription in medical malpractice cases.61
The court relied on Borel v. Young,62 reasoning that only the more
specific provisions of the MMA apply to the exclusion of the more
general provisions on suspension and interruption of prescription.63
As for the original claim against the Santiago plaintiff’s original
defendant–physician, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the catch-all
language of the amended petition, incorporating by reference all the
allegations contained in the original petition, constituted a
pronouncement of the plaintiff’s intent to preserve the allegations
against the physician.64 This reasoning was in spite of the fact that
the only allegation against the physician in the original petition was
responsibility for the fall, and the amended petition deleted all
references to the physician’s responsibility for the fall.65 The Fourth
Circuit found that dismissal of the plaintiff’s original claim against
the original physician would have been proper as superseded by the
plain language of the amended petition but for the amended
petition’s catch-all provision.66 It therefore found that the trial court
erred in dismissing the original fall-related claim against the original
defendant–physician.67
Lastly, the Third Circuit recently held in In re Rideaux68 that
when there are two defendants named in a PCF complaint, the
claimant must pay the $100 filing fee per named defendant to
interrupt prescription or the filing is invalid, even if one defendant is
later voluntarily dismissed.69 In that case, a claimant filed a
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Borel v. Young, 989 So. 2d 42 (La. 2007).
Santiago, 115 So. 3d at 680–82.
Id. at 686–87.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 686–87.
Id.
No. 12-1096, 2013 WL 811628 (La. Ct. App. 3d Mar. 6, 2013).
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(A)(1)(c) (2008).
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proposed complaint of malpractice against two defendants but
submitted only one $100 filing fee.70 The PCF immediately notified
the plaintiff that she had 45 days to submit the correct payment
($200) or the original filing would be invalid.71 The plaintiff failed
to submit the additional filing fee.72 One year later, the plaintiff
notified the PCF of her desire to dismiss the claim against one of the
defendants, and the PCF rescinded its notice of insufficiency of the
filing fee.73 However, the trial court granted the remaining
defendant’s subsequent exception of prescription, and the Third
Circuit affirmed.74 The appellate court reasoned that the language of
the statute regarding filing fees is clear: A filing fee of $100 per
named defendant must be paid within 45 days.75 Because the
plaintiff did not pay the correct filing fee prior to the 45-day
deadline, the initial claim was deemed invalid and insusceptible of
interrupting prescription.76
IV. EXPERT WITNESSES AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Expert testimony is almost always necessary for a plaintiff to
meet his burden in a medical malpractice case.77 For this reason, the
filing of a “no expert motion for summary judgment” by a
defendant–healthcare provider is all but inevitable in cases where a
plaintiff has neglected to retain a qualified expert. Therefore, issues
related to expert witnesses, especially in the context of a motion for
summary judgment, are a pivotal area of medical malpractice law.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently issued a key holding in
this area of the law in the case of Benjamin v. Zeichner.78 There, the
Court determined that the plaintiffs’ expert did not meet the expert
witness qualifications set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:2794(D) and entered a directed verdict for the defense.79 Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:2794 lists four mandatory requirements
for experts: They must (1) be practicing medicine at the time of
testimony or at the time the claim arose; (2) have knowledge of the
standard of care; (3) be qualified based on training and experience;
70. Rideaux, 2013 WL 811628, at *1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id. at *3.
77. See Samaha v. Rau, 977 So. 2d 880 (La. 2008). But see Pfiffner v. Correa,
643 So. 2d 1228 (La. 1994).
78. 113 So. 3d 197 (La. 2013).
79. Id. at 205.
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and (4) be either licensed to practice medicine at the time of trial or
a graduate of an accredited medical school.80
The expert in Benjamin v. Zeichner had given up his licenses to
practice medicine in Alabama and Louisiana prior to trial.81
Defendants argued that because he was not licensed to practice in
any jurisdiction in the United States at the time of trial and despite
the fact that he was licensed and practicing at the time of the alleged
negligence, the Tulane Medical School graduate was nevertheless
unqualified because there was no competent evidence to prove that
he met the requirement of section 9:2794(D)(1)(d), i.e., that he
graduated from an “accredited medical school.”82 There was no
question that the expert was a 1958 graduate of Tulane Medical
School, but the trial court found no admissible evidence that Tulane
was “accredited” by the American Medical Association’s Liaison
Committee on Medical Education in 1958.83 The plaintiffs
attempted to introduce a faxed letter from Tulane as to its 1958
status, but the court ruled that the letter and its attachment were
inadmissible hearsay.84
The Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that although the expert
had relinquished his medical licenses prior to trial, he had begun
reviewing the evidence in the case before having done so.85 The
Third Circuit further noted that the expert’s affidavit was signed in
2004, years before he relinquished his licenses.86 The Supreme
Court granted writs and acknowledged that of the four mandatory
requirements of section 9:2794(D)(1), it was undisputed that the
expert met the first three, i.e., he was practicing at the time of the
claim, had knowledge of the standard of care, and was qualified
based on training and experience.87 The issue was whether the
plaintiffs proved that the expert was either licensed to practice
medicine at the time of trial or was a graduate of an accredited
medical school in satisfaction of Louisiana Revised Statutes section
9:2794(D)(1)(d).88 The Supreme Court found that the evidence did
not conclusively establish that Tulane was accredited at the time of
trial and that the court could not “assume accreditation” based solely

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2794 (2009).
Benjamin, 113 So. 3d at 200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 200–01.
Id. at 201–03.
Id.
Id.
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on the fact that the expert was licensed to practice in Louisiana in
1959.89 The Supreme Court reinstated the directed verdict.90
In Albers v. Vina Family Medicine Clinic,91 the Fourth Circuit
held that an expert affidavit filed in opposition to a no-expert motion
for summary judgment was insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact.92 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant–physician
prescribed narcotic medication to the decedent at two pain clinics,
allegedly causing her addiction to pain medication and ultimately
her death.93 Plaintiffs filed a PCF complaint in June 2006; however,
no evidence was ever submitted to the panel and that proceeding
expired in three years.94 Plaintiffs thereafter filed a post-panel
petition in July 2009.95 The defendant “filed an exception of
prescription which the trial court denied on contra non valentem
grounds due to Hurricane Katrina and its devastating effects.”96 At
the hearing on the exception, counsel for the plaintiffs advised the
court that all records from the clinics where the decedent allegedly
received her medication were lost in Hurricane Katrina “and that the
only records he had to prove his case were certain Medicaid
prescription records.”97
The defendant later propounded written discovery seeking the
identity of any expert witnesses.98 After receiving no response, the
defendant filed a no-expert motion for summary judgment.99 The
motion was filed more than 7 years after the decedent’s death and 17
months after the hearing on the exception of prescription.100 The
court granted the plaintiffs a continuance and reset the motion for
hearing four months after it was filed.101 Two days before the
hearing, the plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum and attached
the affidavit of a specialist in medical toxicology.102 The affidavit
stated that the expert relied on the Recipient Data Sheet from the
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Bureau of Health
Services Financing, Medicaid Management Information Services,
the death certificate, an autopsy protocol, an unverified letter from
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 204–05.
116 So. 3d 940 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2013).
Id. at 943.
Id. at 941.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 942.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals providing the
defendant’s physician identification number and identifying the
defendant as a prescribing provider of the decedent, and an affidavit
from the decedent’s children.103 The plaintiffs contended that these
documents established that the decedent filled multiple prescriptions
for narcotic medication, that some of these prescriptions were filled
under the defendant’s physician identification number, and that the
decedent filled prescriptions or attempted to fill prescriptions
allegedly written by the defendant on several dates over a sevenmonth period.104 They further argued that the autopsy protocol
showed massive amounts of drugs in the decedent’s body and that
the death certificate showed that she died secondary to multiple drug
ingestion.105
The trial court considered the untimely opposition but ultimately
found that the plaintiffs failed to present expert testimony sufficient
to support a breach of the standard of care.106 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, finding that the expert affidavit merely stated conclusions
regarding the medication allegedly prescribed but failed to establish
that the defendant was the physician who actually prescribed the
medication or that several prescriptions allegedly written by him
were enough to establish a breach in the standard of care.107 The
appellate court further noted that the expert affidavit failed to
establish that the prescriptions allegedly prescribed by the defendant
caused or contributed to the decedent’s death.108 The Supreme Court
denied writs.109
In Robin v. Hebert,110 the Third Circuit held that determining
whether a defendant inappropriately prescribed Xanax and clinically
caused the patient’s death are complex medical issues that require
expert evidence.111 The court disregarded the plaintiffs’ argument
that they should be allowed to prove the applicable standard by
relying on the product labeling for Xanax and granted summary
judgment in favor of the physician.112 The Third Circuit affirmed.113

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 943.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 943–44.
Id. at 944.
Id.
Albers v. Vina Family Med. Clinic, 123 So. 3d 1211 (La. 2013).
No. 12−147, 2013 WL 1809821 (La. Ct. App. 3d May 1, 2013).
Id. at *6–8.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *8.
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In Jackson v. Suazo-Vasquez,114 the trial court rejected an
affidavit of a nursing expert that was submitted in opposition to a
no-expert motion for summary judgment.115 Plaintiff filed a claim
against a physician and a dialysis center alleging that they breached
the standard of care when they failed to send his mother to the
hospital after she received dialysis and experienced an episode of
high blood pressure.116 Shortly after leaving the dialysis center, the
patient became nonresponsive and eventually died.117 The medical
review panel found for the defendants, who thereafter filed a motion
for summary judgment in the post-panel proceeding.118 In
opposition, the plaintiff submitted the expert affidavit of a nurse.119
The court found the affidavit insufficient to refute the panel opinion
because the nurse could not address the fault of the defendant–
nephrologist or the issue of whether the alleged malpractice caused
the patient’s death.120 The court granted summary judgment, and the
First Circuit affirmed.121
V. DAMAGES AND LOST CHANCE
Another critical issue in medical malpractice cases is the
question of what type of damages are recoverable by the injured
plaintiff. A frequently litigated issue in this area is the “lost chance”
theory of recovery. Because medical malpractice cases often involve
difficult questions of causation, years ago plaintiffs began urging
courts to define the victim’s injury as a loss of a chance of survival
(or recovery) in cases that posed significant cause-in-fact barriers.
Louisiana courts have largely embraced this creative theory of
recovery.
Under a lost chance theory, the plaintiff need not prove that the
patient would have survived or recovered but for the defendant’s
malpractice; however, the plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she had a chance of
survival and that this chance was lost due to the defendant’s
negligence.122 The Supreme Court has emphasized that in such
cases, the fact-finder must focus on the lost chance as a distinct,
114. 116 So. 3d 773 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2013).
115. Id. at 778.
116. Id. at 774–75.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 777–79.
121. Id.
122. Hebert v. Parker, 796 So. 2d 19, 27 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2001). See also Snia
v. Med. Ctr. of New Orleans, 637 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994).

886

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

compensable injury and value the lost chance as a lump sum award
based on all the evidence in the record, as is done for any other item
of general damages.123 “The lost chance of survival in professional
malpractice cases has a value in and of itself that is different from
the value of a wrongful death or survival claim.”124
In one recent decision addressing the lost chance theory, the
Second Circuit held that a plaintiff may not recover wrongful death
damages and damages for loss of a chance of survival.125 The court
held that in cases where it is questionable to what extent the
defendant’s negligence contributed to the death, a plaintiff must
prove the patient had more than a 50% chance of survival in order to
recover wrongful death damages.126
In Coody v. Barraza, a jury awarded $250,000 for loss of a
chance of survival for a seven-month delay in diagnosing recurrent
ovarian cancer, despite the fact that only one out of five experts
testified that the defendant breached the standard of care.127 The
patient died before trial but had previously stated that she was
“devastated, sick and scared” after finding out about the
misdiagnosis and that she had lost faith in her doctors.128 She also
suffered four years of deterioration and three years of chemotherapy
before her death.129 The patient was survived by three children and a
husband of 47 years, with whom she had close relationships.130 The
Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s award, finding a reasonable
factual basis to determine that the defendant’s breach caused a loss
of chance of a better outcome or longer survival based on evidence
that 10% of recurrent ovarian cancer patients experience a second
remission.131 The court deemed irrelevant the fact that there was no
proof that the patient fell into that 10% or that she would have been
cured of her cancer with an earlier diagnosis.132
Another issue of damages in medical malpractice cases is that of
future medical expenses. Under the MMA, in all malpractice claims
that proceed to trial, the jury is given a special interrogatory asking
whether the plaintiff is in need of future medical care and related

123. Smith v. State, Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 1996).
124. Id. at 548.
125. Bolton v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., No. 47,923–CA, 2013 WL 1748543
(La. Ct. App. 2d Apr. 4, 2013).
126. Id. at *18–19.
127. 111 So. 3d 485, 493 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2013).
128. Id. at 488–89.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 490–92.
132. Id.
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benefits and the amount thereof.133 Under the MMA, “future”
medical expenses are actually defined as all medical expenses and
are not subject to the cap.134 In one recent decision, the Fourth
Circuit held that future medical expenses need not be established by
expert physician testimony.135 A plaintiff may establish future
medical expenses through the testimony of an expert in vocational
rehabilitation counseling and life care planning, paired with
testimony of a forensic accountant to calculate the present value of
the medical expenses.136
VI. INFORMED CONSENT
In addition to the typical negligence medical malpractice claim,
Louisiana law also recognizes a cause of action for a physician’s
failure to adequately disclose the risks and hazards involved in the
medical care to be provided, also known as the failure to obtain
informed consent.137 The informed consent doctrine is based on the
principle that “every human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done to his or her own
body”;138 therefore, when circumstances permit,
a patient should be told the nature of the pertinent ailment or
condition, the general nature of the proposed treatment or
procedure, the risks involved in the proposed treatment or
procedure, the prospects of success, the risks of failing to
undergo any treatment or procedure at all, and the risks of
any alternate methods of treatment.139

133. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.43 (2008).
134. Id.
135. Cooper v. Bouchard Transp., Nos. 2012–CA–0868, 2012–CA–0869,
2012–CA–0870, 2012–CA–0871, 2013 WL 1247707 (La. Ct. App. 4th Mar. 27,
2013).
136. Id.
137. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.39.5(D) (2012) (“In a suit against a
physician or other health care provider involving a health care liability or medical
malpractice claim which is based on the failure of the physician or other health
care provider to disclose or adequately to disclose the risks and hazards involved
in the medical care or surgical procedure rendered by the physician or other health
care provider, the only theory on which recovery may be obtained is that of
negligence in failing to disclose the risks or hazards that could have influenced a
reasonable person in making a decision to give or withhold consent.”).
138. Snider v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 130 So. 3d 922, 930 (La. 2013).
139. Id. (citing Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 411 (La. 1988)
(on rehearing)).

888

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

In a lack of informed consent case, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) The existence of a material risk unknown to the patient;
(2) A failure to disclose a risk on the part of the physician;
(3) That the disclosure of the risk would have led a
reasonable patient in the patient’s position to reject the
medical procedure or choose another course of treatment;
and
(4) Injury.140
These jurisprudential principles have been codified in
Louisiana’s Uniform Consent Law, which provides three
approaches under which a healthcare provider may obtain informed
consent.141 First, a healthcare provider may provide a written
consent form that explains the risks of the procedure and requires
the patient’s written consent.142 Second, a healthcare provider may
deliver the same information and obtain the patient’s consent orally
or by a method “other than” a writing.143 Third, a healthcare
provider may provide one of various “lists” created by the Medical
Disclosure Panel, an entity within the Department of Health and
Hospitals, which is responsible for determining “which risks and
hazards related to medical care and surgical procedures must be
disclosed by a physician or other health care provider to a patient or
person authorized to consent for a patient and establish the general
form and substance of such disclosure.”144 If a healthcare provider
utilizes the lists prepared by the Medical Disclosure Panel in the
manner set forth under the Uniform Consent Law, the patient’s
signature will create a rebuttable presumption that valid consent was
given.145
The Uniform Consent Law was revised in 2012.146 The new
version of the law contains various revisions, most of which relate to
the administrative reorganization of the Medical Disclosure Panel.
Other relevant revisions include deleting the phrase “handwritten
consent” from former Louisiana Revised Statutes section
140. Id. (citing Brandt v. Engle, 791 So. 2d 614, 618 (La. 2001)).
141. For a more in-depth discussion of the operation of the three approaches,
see Snider, 130 So. 3d at 931–32.
142. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 40:1299.39.5(A) (2012).
143. See id. § 40:1299.39.5(C).
144. See id. § 40:1299.39.6.
145. Id. § 40:1299.39.6(O)(1)(a).
146. Previously, the Uniform Consent Law was found in former Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 40:1299.40, which was repealed and reenacted as
Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 40:1299.39.5, 40:1299.39.6, and 40:1299.39.7
by Act No. 759, § 2, 2012 La. Acts 3086–3100. The new statute was effective
June 12, 2012.
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40:1299.40(A)(1) and replacing it with “the voluntary permission of
a patient, through signature, marking, or affirmative action through
electronic means pursuant to R.S. 40:1299.40.1.”147
The Fourth Circuit recently held that in an informed consent
case, a plaintiff may not introduce the testimony of a defendant’s
former patients regarding whether the physician informed or failed
to inform them of the risks involved in the particular procedure at
issue to establish evidence of habit.148 Such testimony is
inadmissible character evidence of other similar acts.149 However, if
the doctor testifies about what he or she told “each and every one”
of his or her patients, a former patient may provide rebuttal
evidence.150
Under the recent holding of Roberts v. Marx,151 a surgeon is not
required to disclose his or her own possible impairments to obtain
informed consent.152 In Roberts, one week after undergoing a retinal
detachment repair surgery, a surgeon performed a vasectomy that
resulted in complications.153 The patient alleged that the surgeon
violated informed consent law by failing to inform him of the risks
associated with the surgeon’s possible impairment.154 The medical
review panel found that the surgeon had no obligation to disclose his
recent eye surgery to the plaintiff.155 The trial court later granted the
surgeon’s motion for summary judgment, and the Second Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that a doctor’s duty of disclosure to a patient
includes only those risks that are material and this was not a material
risk.156 Significantly, the surgeon’s eye doctor indicated that the
surgeon could return to work.157 Moreover, the surgeon’s slight
deficiency in eyesight affected only one eye, and the plaintiff failed
to present expert evidence regarding any effect on the surgeon’s
vision when aided by the surgical magnification instrument.158
In Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s verdict and overruled the
Third Circuit’s finding that a signed consent form was insufficient to
constitute informed consent.159 In that case, the plaintiff, who had a
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

§ 40:1299.39.5(A).
Joseph v. Williams, 105 So. 3d 207, 219–20 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2012).
Id. at 219.
Id. at 220–21.
109 So. 3d 462 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2013).
Id.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 463–64.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465–67.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 467.
130 So. 3d 922 (La. 2013).
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personal and family history of heart trouble, filed suit against a
physician for implanting a pacemaker under allegedly emergent
conditions that was later determined to be unnecessary.160 The
physician told the then 26-year-old patient, who was suffering from
chest pain and a low pulse rate, that he could not be transferred to
another hospital to see his regular cardiologist because the
placement of the pacemaker was an emergency.161 The medical
review panel found that the physician breached the standard of care
because he rushed the decision for implantation.162 However, at trial,
the jury found in favor of the defendant–physician despite expert
testimony that the plaintiff’s condition was neither critical nor
emergent.163
The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the Snider plaintiff did
not give informed consent for the procedure because the consent
form failed to disclose the risks of the patient’s medical conditions
(including the effects of his current medications), the reasonable
therapeutic alternatives and the risks associated with those
alternatives, and the plaintiff’s immediate condition that necessitated
the emergent procedure, all of which were critical to his decisionmaking process.164 Specifically, the Third Circuit held that the
physician’s failure to comply with all of the requirements of former
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 40:1299.40(E)(3)(a),165 which
required disclosure of risks and hazards identified by the Louisiana
Medical Disclosure Panel, constituted a lack of informed consent as
a matter of law.166 Significantly, the portions of the consent form
labeled for this information were left blank.167
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs, reversed the Third
Circuit, and reinstated the trial court’s verdict.168 The Court first
noted that the court of appeal was misguided in focusing only on
subsection (E) of former Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40:1299.40, which enumerated only one method of obtaining

160. Snider v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 129 So. 3d 61, 62–63 (La. Ct. App. 3d
2013).
161. Id. at 62.
162. Id. at 63.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 68–69.
165. The substance of former Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40:1299.40(E)(3)(a) now appears in Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40:1299.39.6(B)(1).
166. Snider, 129 So. 3d at 68.
167. Id.
168. Snider v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 130 So. 3d 922, 939 (La. 2013).
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informed consent.169 It noted that the jury instructions given by the
district court judge
corresponded more with an evaluation of compliance with
the requirements of Subsections (A) or (C) (which require
that the physician or health care provider advise the patient
of the nature and purpose of the procedure and the known
risks associated with the procedure of death, brain damage,
quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any
organ or limb, and/or of disfiguring scars).170
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit’s
focus should have been on the jury’s findings of fact regarding what
the physician actually told the patient, not on what the informed
consent form disclosed pursuant to subsection (E).171 The Court held
that a manifest error standard of review was appropriate for that
question, giving great deference to the jury’s findings.172 Under this
standard, the Court held that there was ample evidence based on the
testimony at trial to support the jury’s findings.173
VII. MEDICAL REVIEW PANELS
Another common source of litigation in Louisiana medical
malpractice law is the MMA’s requirement that plaintiffs submit
their claims to a medical review panel before suit may be filed.174
The medical review panel is charged with rendering an expert
opinion as to whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the
defendant or defendants acted or failed to act within the appropriate
standards of care.175 After reviewing all evidence, the panel must
render one or more of the following expert opinions with written
reasons for their conclusions: (1) the evidence supports the
conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed to comply with
the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint; (2) the
evidence does not support the conclusion that the defendant or
169. Id. at 937–38. Again, the substance of former Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 40:1299.40(E)(3)(a) now appears in Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40:1299.39.6(B)(1).
170. Snider, 130 So. 3d at 937–38. The substance of former Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 40:1299.40(A)(1) now appears in Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 40:1299.39.5(A); the substance of former Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 40:1299.40(C) now appears in Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40:1299.39.5(C).
171. Snider, 130 So. 3d at 938.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 937–38.
174. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(B) (2008).
175. See id. § 40:1299.47(G).
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defendants failed to meet the applicable standard of care as charged
in the complaint; (3) there is a material issue of fact, not requiring
expert opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court.176
If the panel decides that the defendant or defendants breached the
standard of care, then the panel must decide whether the conduct
complained of was a factor of the resultant damages and, if so,
whether the plaintiff suffered: (1) any disability and the extent and
duration of the disability and (2) any permanent impairment and the
percentage of the impairment.177
Each medical review panelist is required to take an oath that he
or she will perform the duties without partiality or favoritism.178 The
MMA also requires panelists to disclose in writing prior to the panel
hearing any employment relationship or financial relationship with
the parties or their attorneys.179 Finally, the MMA provides that any
report of the expert opinion reached by the medical review panel
shall be admissible as evidence in any post-panel lawsuit.180
In Fanguy v. Lexington Insurance Co.,181 the Louisiana Supreme
Court recently held that a medical review panel member’s failure to
disclose a conflict of interest invalidated the panel opinion, but the
Court ordered a new panel proceeding rather than simply excluding
the panel opinion and testimony of the panel physicians.182 In that
case, neither the defendant–physician nor the panelist disclosed the
fact that they were officers of the same medical corporation.183 The
panel found in favor of the defendant–physician, and at trial, the
plaintiff moved to exclude the panel opinion as well as the
testimony of all three panelists.184 The trial court granted the motion
to exclude the offending panelist’s testimony but denied the motion
to exclude the panel opinion or testimony of the two other panel
members.185 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal granted writs and
excluded the panel opinion and testimony of all three panelists,
reasoning that the entire panel was tainted.186 In a per curiam
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part,

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. § 40:1299.47(G)(1), (2), (3).
See id. § 40:1299.47(G)(4).
See id. § 40:1299.47(C)(5).
See id. § 40:1299.47(C)(7).
See id. § 40:1299.47(H).
110 So. 3d 127 (La. 2014).
Id. at 128.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id.
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remanding the matter to the district court pending a new panel
proceeding.187 The Court reasoned:
While we are unable to say the lower courts committed error
in finding that the undisclosed financial relationship between
Dr. Carriere and Dr. Graham presented the appearance of
impropriety, which vitiated Dr. Carriere’s oath of impartiality
and thereby tainted the MRP [medical review panel]
proceedings, we believe that justice would best be served by
ordering the re-constitution of the MRP with different
physician members and allowing that new panel to
deliberate and issue an opinion on the issues presented in
this case.188
VIII. STANDARD OF CARE
Pivotal to almost every medical malpractice case is a
determination of the standard of care applicable to a healthcare
provider. Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:2794(A),
a plaintiff bears the burden of proving (1) the standard of care
applicable to the healthcare provider, (2) whether the healthcare
provider breached that standard of care, and (3) whether any breach
of the standard of care by the healthcare provider proximately
caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries that would not otherwise have
been incurred.189
In Schilling v. Aurich,190 the Third Circuit found that the trial
court erred in granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict where a jury found a breach of the standard of care by a
psychologist who conducted only a phone interview with a patient,
rather than a face-to-face examination, prior to issuing a physician’s
emergency certificate.191 The defendant–psychologist in Schilling
had a long-standing physician–patient relationship with the plaintiff
and was familiar with her history.192 The plaintiff was involuntarily
committed to psychiatric care by the defendant on the day of her 17year-old son’s funeral at which her husband removed his wedding
band, placed it on their deceased son’s hand, and announced to the
plaintiff that their marriage was over.193 At the insistence of the
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Richoux v. Tulane Med. Ctr., 617 So. 2d 13 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1993);
Lee v. Wall, 726 So. 2d 1044 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1999).
190. 91 So. 3d 580 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2012).
191. Id. at 583. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:53 (2001).
192. Schilling, 91 So. 3d at 584.
193. Id. at 581.
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plaintiff’s friends and family, the defendant executed a physician’s
emergency certificate without first conducting a face-to-face
examination.194 The psychologist testified that he did speak with the
plaintiff on the evening of her commitment via telephone, during
which she indicated that she wanted to go “home” with her son, was
“done with everything,” and was going to crash her car or take
pills.195 However, an expert psychologist and member of the
medical review panel testified that Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 28:53(B)(1)’s requirement of an “actual” examination
requires an in-person examination before a person can be
involuntarily committed.196 He further testified that it was a breach
of the standard of care to conduct a phone interview rather than an
in-person examination.197
In another recent decision, the Fourth Circuit found that there
was no reasonable basis for a medical review panel opinion on
which the trial court relied and reversed the judgment in favor of the
defendant–healthcare provider.198
Recent decisions have also spoken to the standard of care that is
applicable to hospitals. One recent case noted that hospitals are held
to a national standard of care; the locality rule does not apply.199 In
another recent case, the Fourth Circuit held that a hospital may be
liable for negligence independent of any negligence of its employees
when the governing board of the hospital fails to select its
employees with reasonable care, furnish the hospital with
reasonably adequate supplies, equipment, and facilities for use in the
treatment and diagnosis of its patients, or provide adequate
procedure for maintaining the safety of its grounds and buildings.200
194. Id.
195. Id. at 588.
196. Id. at 586.
197. Id.
198. In re Brown, No. 2011-CA-1824, 2013 WL 633101 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Feb. 20, 2013). There, a paraplegic patient brought a claim against a hospital’s
rehab unit alleging that a nursing assistant breached the standard of care by
transferring her from a wheelchair to a bed without using a slide board, causing the
patient to fall and fracture her tibia. Id. at *1. The trial court found no breach of the
standard of care based on the medical review panel opinion that a slide board is
not necessary when transferring with the assistance of another person. Id. at *4.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding no reasonable basis for the panel opinion. Id.
at *4–5. The medical record indicated that a slide board should have been used
when transferring the patient to and from the bed, and three experts likewise
testified that a slide board should have been used. Id. at *5. The appellate court
awarded $65,000 in general damages. Id. at *6.
199. Richardson v. Christus Schumpert Health Sys., 110 So. 3d 264 (La. Ct.
App. 2d 2013).
200. Papania v State ex rel., 108 So. 3d 256 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2013). In this
case, the hospital was liable for two system failures. Id. at 260–61. First, the
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IX. THE PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND
Another complex issue that often faces medical malpractice
litigants is the involvement of the PCF, which may become a party
to the litigation once there has been a judgment of liability or a
settlement. Under the MMA, a plaintiff’s damages in excess of
$100,000 may be recovered from the PCF, but any such damages
may not exceed $500,000. Further, once a healthcare provider has
admitted liability up to the statutory maximum of $100,000, the PCF
cannot contest liability when there is a binding settlement for
$100,000 by the healthcare provider, either before or after
trial.201 At that point, the only remaining issue is the damages, if
any, owed by the PCF.202 However, the court must approve the
settlement, and the PCF must be given notice and an opportunity to
object to the settlement.203
In one recent decision, the court held that a medical malpractice
claimant seeking excess damages from the PCF was subject to the
notice requirements set forth in Louisiana Revised Statutes section
40:1299.44(C). If the claimant fails to provide the required notice
via service of a copy of the Petition for Approval ten days before its
filing, the claimant does not have a cause of action against the PCF
for excess damages.204
Another recent decision recognized that the PCF cannot stop
future medical expense payments without a court order, despite a
change in the plaintiff’s circumstances.205 In that case, a child who
suffered a stroke in utero was awarded future medical expenses.206
In conjunction with that award, the trial court ordered the PCF to
make quarterly advanced payments of custodial care expenses to a
trust in the child’s name for 24-hour care, accessible by his mother

hospital did not follow its procedure to have a detailed summary of the patient’s
admission history dictated and transcribed until two weeks after the patient’s
death. Id. at 260. As a result, the detailed admission summary was unavailable for
a subsequent physician’s review on the patient’s next presentation to the
emergency department. Id. The second system failure occurred where the more
informal summary of the patient’s treatment, which was given to the patient’s
family at the time of discharge, contained incorrect information, including test
results. Id. at 261.
201. See Pendleton v. Barrett, 675 So. 2d 720, 725 (La. 1996).
202. Id.
203. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44 (2008).
204. Howard v. Mamou Health Res., No. 12-820, 2013 WL 811676 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Mar. 6, 2013).
205. Watkins v. Lake Charles Mem. Hosp., 114 So. 3d 503 (La. Ct. App. 3d
2013).
206. Id. at 505.
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who was providing care for him.207 Years later, the PCF learned that
the child, now a grown man, was married and no longer living with
his mother.208 The PCF discontinued payments and requested an
Independent Medical Examination.209 The trial court held, and the
Third Circuit affirmed, that a change in the claimant’s condition did
not allow the PCF to make a unilateral decision to cease
payments.210 The PCF was required to first obtain a ruling
modifying the prior judgment before discontinuing the payments.211
In Buras v. Deloach, et al., the PCF’s exceptions of no cause
and no right of action to a Petition for Settlement Approval with
reservation of rights against the PCF were held to be properly
overruled where the plaintiffs’ allegations of improper prescription
of narcotic medication without proper treatment and counseling
unquestionably articulated a valid cause of action in medical
malpractice.212 The PCF urged the court to pierce the allegations of
the petition and craft an unpled intentional tort arising from a
purported criminal enterprise with quid pro quo business
transactions rather than actual medical treatment.213 The Fourth
Circuit strictly applied the Coleman v. Deno214 factors and refused
to accept the PCF’s arguments.215
The Fourth Circuit also found that the PCF’s exception of
prematurity to the Petition for Settlement Approval was properly
overruled because, despite the fact that the defendant–healthcare
providers did not file an answer within ten days of the filing of the
settlement petition, the answer had been filed by the time the trial
court approved the settlement.216
The Fourth Circuit also found that the trial court did not err in
refusing to include the plaintiffs’ collateral voluntary dismissal of
two non-settling healthcare providers in the settlement-approval
judgment.217 “[T]here is no statutory provision that requires a
judgment approving a settlement agreement with one healthcare

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 505–06.
210. Id. at 510–11.
211. Id.
212. Buras v. Deloach, No. 2012-CA-1511, slip op. at 2 (La. Ct. App. 4th Apr.
19, 2013) (appellate court opinion denying supervisory writ application).
213. Id.
214. Id. slip op. at 7–8. See Coleman v. Deno, 813 So. 2d 303 (La. 2002).
215. Buras, No. 2012-CA-1511, slip op. at 2.
216. Id. slip op. at 9–10.
217. Id. slip op. at 11.
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provider to include information about collateral agreements with
other providers in the judgment.”218

218. Id. This matter was brought to the Fourth Circuit on appeal and alternative
application for supervisory writs. The Fourth Circuit granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss appeal, granted the writ to the docket, and after oral argument,
denied the writ with written reasons.

